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Information as a Double-Edge Sword:  Implications for Food Standards and Labels
Abstract
An analytical model is developed to examine product quality labeling.  Prior to labeling all
consumers are willing to pay a premium for the quality characteristic but product quality cannot be
observed directly.  If production costs are increasing, the total quantity produced may contain a mix
of products – with and without the high-valued attribute.  In the pooled equilibrium demand is
influenced by perceptions of the product mix.  After labels are introduced the market is separated
into two sectors, conventional and high-valued.  The economic implications of labels are examined
by contrasting welfare in the separating equilibrium with welfare in the pooled equilibrium.  Under
the models’ maintained assumptions the conventional sector loses welfare, while producers of the
high-valued product experience gains. In addition, producers of the high-valued product may have
incentives to promote costly labeling despite net-welfare losses. 2
Introduction
There is increasing pressure on governments to mandate or enhance the use of food labels
to achieve social objectives (Golan et. al, 2001).  Contemporary debate and legislation surround the
labeling of genetically modified foods (Teisl and Caswell, 2003), organic foods (Fetter and Caswell,
2002), dolphin-safe labeling (Teisl et. al, 2002), country of origin labeling (AMS, 2003), and farmer-
owned brands (Hayes and Lence, 2002).  The policy debates suggest substantial gains and losses
from labeling (Golan et. al, 2001).  This paper provides an analytical model to assess the welfare
implications of labels that signal credence attributes.  
A number of analytical models examine the welfare effects of labeling that enables
consumers to differentiate products by credence attributes (Crespi and Maretee, 2001; Huffman et.
al, 2002; Sedjo and Sparrow, 2002).  Maintained assumptions about the industry’s cost structure
often lead to a characterization of the market, ex-ante labels, as either a complete “breakdown”
(Crespi and Marettee, 2001) or comprised of a product which does not contain the valued credence
attribute (Huffman et. al, 2002). For example, Crespi and Maretee (2001) maintain an assumption
of complete market failure in the absence of public or private food safety certification.  Consumers
can not differentiate between safe and unsafe foods and the cost of producing unsafe foods is
assumed to be less than the cost of producing safe food.  Given  uncertainty, problems of moral
hazard, and competitive market assumptions, the market breaks down as the bad chases out the good
(Akerlof, 1970).  Following a similar logic,  Huffman et al., (2002) characterize the ex-ante labeling
situation as one in which only the GM (genetically modified) product is available.  Modeling the ex-
ante labeling scenario in this way leads to a familiar conclusion that net-welfare is enhanced by the
introduction of labels.3
The analytical model developed in this paper relaxes the constant costs of production
assumption.  Like Sedjo and Swallow (2002), who observe that eco-friendly production practices
may co-exist with conventional production practices in the wood product sector even before eco-
labels are introduced, we assume supply conditions in which some proportion of the total product
may contain the high-valued credence attribute, even before the introduction of labels that signal
quality differences to consumers.  Unlike Sedjo and Swallow (2002), but similar to Spence (1973),
our model allows perceptions of the mix to influence demand even before labels are introduced. The
introduction of labels provides a new market signal which precipitates a separating equilibrium and
a redistribution of gains and losses.  
Under the models’ maintained assumptions, welfare comparisons between the ex-ante and
ex-post  labeling scenario lead to a number of key insights.  First, the conventional sector loses
welfare while high-valued product producers gain.  Second, the net-welfare effects of labeling
become ambiguous and conditions exist in which producers have an incentive to introduce costly
labels despite a potential for net-welfare losses. Third, the model demonstrates why welfare claims,
based on studies that identify a willingness to pay for a high-valued credence attribute, can be
misleading. 
Model 
We use a partial static-equilibrium framework to examine the market before  and after the
introduction of a label  which differentiates products by a desired credence attribute.  Consumers
can not evaluate credence attributes, even in use (Golan et. al, 2001).  The label is assumed to
differentiate the product into two distinct sets – a subset defined by the label and its complement set.
Thus the label  is  a standard grade label (Bowbrick, 1992).  Anyone who uses the label must label4
pc  γ0  γ2qc (1)
ph  γ0  γ1  γ2qh (2)
in accordance with a promulgated set of standards.  In the discussion that follows the standard grade
label differentiates the product into distinct sets, conventional and high valued (hv).  Hereafter,
conventional refers to a specific commodity or product that does not contain the credence attribute.
 The high valued (hv) product possesses the credence attribute, otherwise it is equivalent to the
conventional product.
Demand
The aggregate demand curve traces out the reservation prices for each additional product
quantity. The reservation price for the conventional product is  an inverse function of quantity and
is defined as follows:  
where,  , and   is the quantity consumed of the conventional product.  However, at each γ0, γ2>0 qc
quantity demanded, there is premium for the presence of the credence attribute.  Therefore, the
demand curve that traces out the reservations prices for the high valued product is as follows: 
where  and   is the quantity consumed of the high valued product.  The high value product γ1 >0 qhv
demand curve slopes downward from the vertical intercept,  .  γ0γ1
In some pooled equilibria the supply conditions are such that a mix of high value and
conventional produce enter the market even in the absence of a label that allows consumers to
differentiate on the presence of a credence attribute.  In situations where a mix of products5
pα  (1α)pc  αph
 (1α)(γ0  γ2qc)  α(γ0  γ1  γ2qh)
 γ0  αγ1  γ2Q
(3)
mcc  µ0  µ1qc (4)
characterize the pooled equilibria we model consumer demand based on consumers perception of
the product mix.   This perception may be informed through a variety of information sources other
than labels (e.g., media, informal networks).  The perceived proportion of the credence product in




In this model there are two product sectors, a conventional product sector and a high valued
product sector.  Within each sector, firm-level production functions are constant returns to scale. 
However, there is at least one input (e.g. land) in the high valued sector that is inelastic in supply.
Unit costs in the conventional sector may be constant or increasing.  In the increasing cost scenario,
the relationship between firm-level marginal cost and quantity is:
where,   is a fixed cost component,  is the slope of conventional product marginal cost. µ0>0 µ1>06
mch  δ0  δ1qh (5)








mcA  φ0  φ1Q (7)
The relationship between marginal cost and market share in the high valued product sector is 
where   is a fixed cost component,  the slope of marginal cost in market share.   δ0>0 δ1>0
Pooled Equilibrium
In a pooled equilibrium, demanders do not distinguish between the conventional and high
valued  products.  An  equilibrium occurs where the aggregate demand in the pooled equilibrium,
, equals the  marginal cost established by the aggregate supply curve.  The aggregate supply curve pα
is derived by solving equations (4) and (5) for quantities supplied and adding these together to obtain
total quantity supplied,
Solving equation (6) for mc results in 






pooled good.  The equilibrium  is determined by setting equation (7) equal to equation (3), Q p7













Equation 9 relates quantity demanded to supply, demand, and perceptions of the product mix. Total
quantity consumed  is inversely related to the slope of the demand curves and the costs of production
.  Total quantity demanded is a positively function of willingness to pay for the product and the
premium for the credence attribute.   In addition, quantity demanded depends on perceptions of the
product mix.
In the pooling equilibrium, the marginal cost equations for the conventional and high value
product are equal.  Hence, the  equilibrium quantity of the high value product may be solved for in
terms of the quantity of the conventional product.  Setting equation (4) equal to equation (5) leads
to the following:
where   and  .  Equation 10 explicitly identifies a positive relationship β0  (δ0  µ0)/µ1 β1  δ1/µ1
between quantities of the high and low valued product in the pooled equilibrium. Increases in the
level of the high valued production imply an increase in the level of  conventional production.  This8
γ0  αγ1  γ2(q
p
h  β0  β1q
p






γ0  αγ1  γ2β0  δ0
δ1  γ2(1  β1)
, (12)
falls directly from the maintained assumptions that both products are produced in the pooling
equilibrium and that marginal costs are equated at equilibrium price.
The quantity of the high valued product can be derived from the following equilibrium
condition:
 Where, the right-hand side of equation 11 represents the pooled demand curve , identified in
equation (3).  However, quantity    is replaced by adding together the equilibrium quantities of the Q
high valued and conventional product – expressed in terms of the high valued product (as defined
by equation 10). The right-hand side of equation 11 identifies the marginal cost of producing the
equilibrium quantity of the high-valued product.  Re-arranging equation (11) solves for
where the  quantity of the high valued product,  , is defined in terms of supply, demand, and q
P
h
perception parameters.  Quantity of the high valued product is inversely related to the slope of the
demand curve.  Increases in the costs of producing the high valued product, relative to the
conventional product, also lead to reductions in the quantity of the high valued product produced.
The quantity is positively related to the initial reservation price for  the  product  and the premium
for the credence attribute.  Moreover, the quantity of the high valued product consumed depends on
on perceptions of the product mix. 9
Figure 1, depicts a  potential  pooling equilibrium.  In order to simplify the graph supply of
the conventional product is assumed to be elastic.  Hence, the equilibrium price is set at  which P
equals the marginal cost of producing the conventional product,  . The pooled demand curve mcc
, ,  intersects the aggregate supply curve,  at the pooled equilibrium quantity,  .  Because some pα Q p
portion of the high value products marginal cost curve lies below the equilibrium price both the
conventional and the high value products are competitive.  In the model’s pooled equilibrium
consumers are unable to differentiate any one quantity consumed but the presence of the credence
attribute, due to cost conditions, is reflected in consumer perceptions of a mixed product. 
Modeling the pooling equilibrium as a product mix, despite the absence of labels, seems
consistent with current observations.  For example, Klonsky et. al, (1998) discuss surveys, conducted
by the Organic Farming Research Foundation, that identify the organic production practices without
organic certification.  GM and non-GM products co-exist in the market without labeling.  In the
absence of labeling, the product mix depends mainly on assumptions made about the marginal cost
of producing the conventional and high product.   In Figure 1, the total quantity is identified by
;  , is the level of the high valued product and .   Q p qh qc  Q P  qh
Dead-Weight Loss of Uninformed Perceptions
Consumers perception of the product mix determines the pooled demand,  .  However, in p p
some situations consumers may be misinformed about the relative mix of the product quality
supplied. When this occurs  resources will be mis-allocated and a dead-weight loss results.  Figure
2 characterizes a situation in which consumers perceive the proportion of high valued products to be









product  and purchase  rather than . Where  is the equilibrium quantity that would be Qα Qλ Qλ
consumed under correct perceptions of the market mix and  is the quantity consumed when Qα
perceptions are mistaken.  Some of this over-allocation benefits producers (represented by the striped
area) but the triangle ABC  represents a dead-weight loss – Pareto improvements are foregone.
            In this situation information about the correct product mix can lead to welfare improvements.
For example, let   be the actual share of the conventional produce in the market.  Also, let λ  q
p
c /Q p
, be the equilibrium quantity when consumers correctly perceive the mix of products in the market. Q
p
λ
 Then compared to an initial, uninformed equilibrium, the benefit of informing consumers is:






α α > λ
The dead-weight loss of uninformed perceptions raises three points.  First, providing
information about the existing product mix can improve welfare and therefore, extension efforts
designed to inform consumers about agricultural production practices can be beneficial.  Second,
information has distributive implications.  In the example described by figure two, producers benefit
from consumers incorrect perceptions about the proportion of the  produce with the credence attribute.
On the other hand, producers will be hurt when consumers under-estimate the proportion of the
market share with the credence attribute.  Finally, the benefits of a labeling institution will depend,


















The introduction of labels allows producers to signal credence attributes to consumers. The
signals created by many labels implicitly define a complement set.  For example, organic foods
implicitly define the conventional sector as non-organic.  Pesticide ‘free’ implicitly defines the
complements set as that set of goods which contain some level of pesticide.  The complementary
relationship between a labeled good and a non-labeled good suggests consumers valuation of the
labeled product simultaneously involves consideration of the conventional good.  Therefore, the new
equilibrium in the labeled and non-labeled markets are interdependent.  This interdependency is made
explicit in the separating equilibrium – an equilibrium which identifies quantities of consumption and
production, in both the high valued and conventional sector, where neither producers or consumers
have an incentive to alter their production or consumption choices. 
 The switching point equilibrium is defined where:
and 
Equation 14 identifies the switching point, where  the marginal benefit of consuming the last quantity
of the new product is equal to the marginal opportunity cost of foregoing consumption of the
conventional product.  Equation 15 states that the marginal benefit of the last unit of the conventional
good consumed must equal the marginal cost of producing that unit.12
Figure 3, provides a graphical illustration of the equilibrium conditions.  Again, the graphical
representation is simplified by assuming an elastic supply in the conventional sector.  Thus, the
equilibrium price in the conventional sector is set at  .  Reservation willingness to pay for each the p

c
high valued and conventionally valued product is characterized  by the downward sloping demands, p
s
h














equation 14 is graphically identified.  At this point the marginal benefits of consuming 
the high valued product are just equal to the marginal cost of forgone conventional consumption of
the conventional good. Graphically speaking, the vertical distance points A and B are equal to the
vertical distance between points C and D.   High valued consumption (quantity to the left of the










 After the switching point equilibrium consumption in the  conventional sector continues until
the marginal benefits of conventional consumption equal the marginal costs.  This point is identified
by equation 15.   In figure 3 this point occurs at  .   The separating equilibrium occurs at prices Q





additional incentives for production or consumption.
Equations 14 and 15 can be used to solve equilibrium quantities of conventional and high



















µ0  µ1a0  γ1  δ0
δ1  µ1a1






quantity in the conventional market is stated in terms of the quantity produced in the high valued
market. 
where   and  .   Note that equation (15) implies that the a0  (γ0  µ0)/(µ1  γ2) a1 γ2/(µ1  γ2)
conventional product decreases as the new product increases. The quantity of the new product in the
separating equilibrium can be found by substituting equation (16) back into equation (14): 
where  , so the numerator of the last line of equation (17) is the marginal q
qh0
c  (γ0  µ0)/(γ2  µ1)
net surplus for the new product at zero minus marginal net surplus for the conventional product when
no high valued product is produced. Hence the quantity of the high valued product produced is
positively related to its initial net surplus and inversely related to the net surplus associated with the
conventional product.
Model Implications
In this section, we examine a number of key insights that the model illuminates. First, the
model identifies a number of distributional issues that may result when labels are introduced to14
identify credence attributes to consumers.  Specifically, under the model’s assumptions, we argue that
high valued producers are made better off while consumers who remain in the conventional market
are made worse off.  Thus, the new information generated by labels acts as a double-edge sword –
helping some and hurting others.  Second, the model has implications for examining the net-welfare
effects of costly and costless labeling.  We discuss a situation in which producers have an incentive
to promote and pay for labels despite the possibility that it leads to negative welfare effects.  In
addition, the model identifies the potential shortcomings of using willingness to pay studies, or
general preference studies, as the primary basis for advocating labeling.  Finally we re-emphasize the
important role that perceptions play when the pooling equilibrium product can be characterized as a
mixed product. 
Figure 4, illustrates the double-edge sword for a scenario in which we assume supply for the
conventional product is perfectly elastic.   In Figure 4 the introduction of labels leads to equilibrium
prices of , for the high valued product and  for the conventional product.  Under the assumption Ph P

c
of elastic conventional supply, the price for the mixed product in the pooling equilibria is equivalent
to the conventional price in the separating equilibrium.  Producers of the high valued product clearly
gain.  This may explain, in part, why standard grades are often advocated by producer groups of the
high valued product (e.g., the organic industry petitioned U.S. Congress to standardize the use of the
word organic). The gain to high valued producers, relative to the pooling equilibrium, is represented
by the shaded region  .   PhBHP

c15
Conventional consumers lose surplus in this situation. Prior to the introduction of labels this
group of consumers paid  for the mixed product.  In the separating equilibria this group of P

c
consumers pays the same price,  , but consumes the pure conventional product only.  In addition, P

c
some demand exits the sector entirely.  In figure 4 this loss of surplus is represented by the area  . ICFJ
The points I and J represent points on the pooled demand curve that existed prior to labeling. The loss
of consumer surplus results because this demand can no longer be realized; Oddly enough, when
labeling implicitly defines its complement set, a missing market for the pooled product results and
the conventional sector is worse off.  
Examining this situation in close detail may help explain why the set of consumers made
worse off by labeling are unlikely to voice concerns about labeling.  In the model, this set of
consumers has the same premium for the high valued product as the group who actually consumes
them.  However, once the cost of obtaining the labeled product is taken into consideration this group
consumes the pure conventional good.  This subset of consumers prefers the mixed product, at the
pooled price, but this product no longer exists.  Prior to labeling, these consumers are only aware of
the premium they are willing to pay for the conventional good; They do not anticipate changes in the
product price.  Hence, ex-ante the label some consumers only know the premium they would pay for
the high valued product.  For some set of consumers, failure to consider the cost of the high-valued
product may lead to a failure to recognize the primary implication of the label to them – that they
become consumers of the pure conventional product after labels are introduced. 
The net-welfare results in the high-valued sector are less clear.  As previously discussed,
producers of the high-valued product gain producer surplus.  Consumers on the one hand, enjoy a16
marginal benefit of  for each unit of the high valued product consumed.    On the other hand, high γ1
valued consumers also forgo  the benefits of consuming the mixed product at the conventional price,
; a part of this loss is not directly transferred to producers because of the increasing costs of P

c
production.  Figure 4 represents the resource costs of producing the high valued product, part of
which represents a loss of benefits associated with consuming the mixed product which is not fully
captured by the producers.  
Given explicit assumptions about perceptions, supply, and demand parameters, the model can
be used to simulate changes in net-welfare that result from the shift from a pooling equilibrium to
a separating equilibria. Under costly  labeling our model can be used to identify situations  in which
producers may advocate costly labels, despite the possibility that they reduce net-welfare.  This
situation can be developed intuitively.  Re-examine figure 4 and note that producer surplus in the high
value sector increases (PS+).  Consumer surplus of consumers who remain in  the conventional sector
decreases (CSc -).  Assume that consumers in the high-valued sector gain on average (CSh +) and there
is no net gain for conventional producers.  Also, assume a fixed cost of labeling equal to  .  Under τ
these assumptions there is some  , that leads to a net-welfare loss such that τ, where τ<PSh
.  This occurs when the loss to conventional consumers exceeds the gain to PSh  CSh  CSc  τ<0
high-valued consumers.
The model also illuminates contradictions between willingness to pay surveys that identify
a premium for eco-labels and organic produce  (see  Loureiro and Hine, 2001) and the observation
that price premiums often fail to arise (Sedjo and Swallow, 2002) and that some consumers fail to
purchase organic produce despite higher willingness to pay (San Jose Mercury News, 2002).  First,17
the model points out that price premiums that emerge in the market depend on  supply as well as
demand conditions in both the conventional and high valued market.   When willingness to pay for
a labeled product is constant across quantity demanded, the market premium allowed by labels depend
on the slope of demand as well as the slopes of  supply.  For example, under conditions assumed by
the model, the  equilibrium price for the high valued depends, in part, on the relative slopes of the
marginal cost curves in the conventional and high-valued sector.  Specifically, the equilibrium price
in the high-valued sector is inversely related to the  ratio of the  high-valued to conventional supply
slopes.   
 An interesting aspect of the model is the suggestion that some market segment will not be
willing to pay for the high valued product despite having the same price premium as consumers who
consume the high valued product.  This segment of demand is identified in figure 3 as the quantity
demanded between  and  .  Over this range the marginal benefits are higher in the conventional Q
s
h Q
sector than in the high valued sector.  Models that identify a  willingness to pay for credence attributes
but fail to take into account  cross-price elasticities for the conventional product may greatly over-
state the benefits of labeling.   Thompson (1998),  notes the lack of studies based on direct
observation of consumer behavior and therefore, the absence of empirical estimates of own-price and
cross-price elasticities for organic produce. 
Finally, the model introduced in this paper emphasizes consumers initial perceptions of the
product mix.  This perception is an important  determinant of welfare in the pooling equilibrium and
subsequently, influence the welfare effects of the switching equilibrium precipitated by labels.  This
has two important implications for policy.  First, as discussed earlier, dead-weight losses can be
avoided by providing information, other than labeling, about the character of the product mix being18
consumed.  The net-benefits of these programs depend on the benefits of improved corrections versus
the costs of providing this information.  If perceptions are incorrect and extending information about
the correct product mix is costly, efficiently achieving correct perceptions is unlikely. (The marginal
costs of improving perceptions are likely to exceed the marginal benefit at some point).  Still,
significant improvements in welfare may result from facilitating improved perceptions of the product
mix.  Second, in situations where perceptions are incorrect, labels have a tertiary benefit that this
paper does not address explicitly. Namely, they remove dead-weight losses which characterize the
pooling equilibrium. 19
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Figure 3    Separating Equilibrium 
Price 
p 
Quantity
p
p 
mc
h
p 
B 
A 
C 
D 
Q
h 
c 
* 
E 
F
s
q h 
-
c 
s 
s
h
mc
s
c24